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Abstract
This article argues that a thoroughgoing and meaningful food democracy should entail something closely akin to ‘radical’
food sovereignty, a political programmewhich confronts the key social relational bases of capitalism. The latter comprise, in
essence, ‘primitive accumulation,’ the alienability or commodification of land and other fundamental use values, and mar-
ket dependence. A thoroughgoing food democracy of this kind thus challenges the structural separation of the ‘economic’
and ‘political’ spheres within capitalism and the modern state (the state-capital nexus), a separation which enables purely
political rights and obligations (‘political’ freedom or formal democracy) whilst simultaneously leaving unconstrained the
economic powers of capital and their operation through market dependence (‘economic’ unfreedom or the lack of sub-
stantive democracy). We argue that much ‘food democracy’ discourse remains confined to this level of ‘political’ freedom
and that, if food sovereignty is to be realized, this movement needs to address ‘economic’ unfreedom, in other words, to
subvert capitalist social-property relations. We argue further that the political economy of food constitutes but a subset
of these wider social relations, such that substantive food democracy is seen here to entail, like ‘radical’ food sovereignty,
an abrogation of the three pillars upholding capitalism (primitive accumulation, absolute property rights, market depen-
dence) as an intrinsic part of a wider and more integrated movement towards livelihood sovereignty. We argue here that
the abrogation of these conditions upholding the state-capital nexus constitutes an essential part of the transformation of
capitalist social-property relations towards common ‘ownership’―or, better, stewardship―of the means of livelihood, of
which substantive food democracy is a key component.
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1. Introduction
This article contends that if food democracy is to real-
ize its full potential, it should entail something closely
akin to ‘radical’ food sovereignty. This represents a po-
litical programme which, actually or by implication, chal-
lenges the essential social relational foundations of cap-
italism. ‘Radical’ food sovereignty is here differentiated
from ‘progressive’ food sovereignty, the latter having
much in common with ‘formal’ food democracy and the
current discourse of ‘food as a commons’ in its deficient
understanding of, most saliently, capitalism, the state,
and class (see for discussion of food democracy and ‘food
as a commons’: Vivero-Pol, Ferrando, de Schutter, &
Mattei, 2019; see for discussion of ‘radical’ and ‘progres-
sive’ food sovereignty: Holt-Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011;
Tilzey, 2017, 2018). The key social relational foundations
of capitalism comprise ‘primitive accumulation’―which
entails the commodification of labour power attendant
on the expropriation of producers from their means of
production―, the alienability or commodification of land
and other fundamental use values―the conferral of ab-
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solute property rights over land and other fundamental
use values necessary for human existence―, andmarket
dependence―dependence on the capitalist market in or-
der to secure themeans of livelihood. Our model of food
democracy thus throws into question the structural sep-
aration of the ‘economic’ and ‘political’ spheres within
capitalism and themodern state (the state-capital nexus).
This duality confers purely political rights and obligations
(‘political’ freedom or formal democracy) whilst simulta-
neously exempting from constraint the economic pow-
ers of capital and their operation through market depen-
dence (‘economic’ unfreedom or the lack of substantive
democracy; see Tilzey, 2017, 2018, for further details).
We contend that prevalent ‘food democracy’ (and
closely related ‘food as a commons’) discourse remains
limited to this level of ‘political’ freedom (see for
overviews Hassanein, 2008; Vivero-Pol et al., 2019). We
suggest that food democracy in this form needs, there-
fore, to widen its remit to address ‘economic’ unfree-
dom, in other words to subvert capitalist social-property
relations, if food sovereignty is ever to become reality.
We argue further that the political economy of food com-
prises but a part of these wider social relations. In this
way, substantive food democracy is considered here to
require, like ‘radical’ food sovereignty, an abrogation of
the three supporting pillars capitalism (primitive accu-
mulation, absolute property rights, market dependence),
an integral element in a broader and more coherent
movement towards livelihood sovereignty (Tilzey, 2018).
We contend that the demolition of these pillars uphold-
ing the state-capital nexus represents a key element
of the transformation of capitalist social-property rela-
tions towards common ‘ownership’―or, better, steward-
ship―of the means of livelihood, of which substantive
food democracy is a key component. Here we should
note that ‘stewardship’ implies a relation of guardianship
towards the means of livelihood, abrogating thereby no-
tions of absolute property rights, or complete dominion,
over nature and other members of society.
In exploring the discourse of food democracy, this
article deploys a theoretical perspective which inte-
grates political Marxism (Brenner, 1985; Wood, 1995),
neo-Gramscian international political economy (Bieler &
Morton, 2004; Cox, 1993), regulation theory (Boyer &
Saillard, 2002; Jessop & Sum, 2013), and Poulantzian
state theory (Poulantzas, 1978). The article also has
affinities with the important work on imperialism and
sub-imperialism of Ruy Mauro Marini (see Marini, 1972,
1973). This approach stands in contrast to ‘populism’
in agrarian political theory, represented by McMichael
(2013) and van der Ploeg (2008), for example, the lat-
ter having strong affinities with ‘formal’ food democracy.
This ‘populism,’ like ‘formal’ food democracy, is charac-
terized by an elision of class (particularly in respect of
class differentiation amongst the ‘peasantry’), a radical
under-theorization of the state, and assumptions regard-
ing the full trans-nationalization and unity of capital. This
article does concur with agrarian ‘populism,’ however,
in its concern for the ecological dimension and its ad-
vocacy of agroecology (Altieri & Toledo, 2011) and food
sovereignty—the latter, though, on its ‘radical’ defini-
tion (see Tilzey, 2018, for full elaboration of an ecolog-
ical perspective as political ecology). It stands also in
contrast to ‘orthodox’ Marxism, represented for exam-
ple by Bernstein (2010) and Jansen (2015), characterized
by its class reductionism, its instrumentalist view of the
state, its reification of developmentalism, and its failure
to comprehend the profound importance of the ecologi-
cal dimension.
Deploying this approach, we suggest that food
democracy remains inadequate to its task if it fails to ad-
dress the social-property relations underpinning capital-
ist food regimes; and that its singular focus on ‘democ-
racy’ (the reified sphere of ‘politics’) rather than address-
ing political economy (the dialectical relation between
the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’) is symptomatic of its
differential locus in the global North, and its association
with ‘progressive’, rather than ‘radical,’ food sovereignty
(see Tilzey, 2017). The former assumes that food democ-
racy is somehow ‘beyond class’ other than in terms of
the simplistic binary between the ‘empire’ of the ‘corpo-
rate’ food regime and the ‘multitude’ of civil society. We
emphasize that the term ‘class’ is deployed in this article,
by contrast, in a non-reductive sense, whereby power re-
lations and exploitationmay be expressed and take place
through class, ethnic, racial, gender, religious, etc. cate-
gories. It is also to recognize that ‘objective’ class posi-
tion may not translate into ‘subjective’ class positional-
ity, and that the latter can only be understood through
the ways that exploitation and discrimination are actu-
ally experienced and understood by actors, as expressed
in terms of ‘cultural politics.’ Such a non-reductive under-
standing of class follows in the political and cultural tra-
ditions of Marxian thinking exemplified by, for example,
Gramsci (1971) and Thompson (1991). Accordingly, we
maintain that ‘class struggle’ remains fundamental to the
dynamics of the state-capital nexus and its food regimes,
and to the possibility of its subversion, not by the ‘mul-
titude’ as a generality, but rather by particular classes
which, located overwhelmingly in the global South, have
undergone least absorption into the economic and polit-
ical structures of liberal democracy.
If not the ‘multitude’ of civil society, then, which
social interests and forces are likely to advocate and
carry through such a programme of ‘radical’ food
sovereignty (which we might otherwise term substan-
tive food democracy, agrarian democracy, or, more in-
tegrally, livelihood sovereignty)? We argue that such in-
terests and forces comprise in the main the ‘precariat’
of the global South―the middle/lower peasantry, infor-
mal sector workers, and indigenous groups. Unlike the
majority in the global North (and selectively in the BRICS
sub-imperium), whose consumer lifestyles are sustained
actually, or integrated normatively, into the capitalist
‘imperial mode of living’ (a neo-imperial relation with
the global South; Brand & Wissen, 2018) and into the
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norms of liberal democracy, this Southern precariat in-
creasingly sees little hope of salvation in capitalist ‘de-
velopment’ or in the machinations of ‘representative’
democracy (the term ‘neo-imperial’ represents the appli-
cation of neoliberal policies in the global South under the
auspices of imperial powers and collaborating Southern
elites. The terms ‘neo-imperial’ and ‘neoliberal’ can in
this article be treated, therefore, as virtual synonyms). It
seeks, therefore, an alternative future premised on land
redistribution, agroecological production to meet funda-
mental social needs, and participative democracy (see
Intriago, Gortaire Amézcua, Bravo, & O’Connell, 2017;
Tilzey, 2019a). Such a view is captured in the Andean con-
cept of buen vivir (Giunta, 2014; Intriago et al., 2017).
This approach combines the need to address both the
discursive and thematerial (social property relations; the
‘political’ and the ‘economic’) bases of oppression and
marginalization in order to secure livelihood sovereignty.
The approach in this article, then, comprises both an-
alytics of the state-capital nexus and its food regimes
through an ontology of political ecology (Tilzey, 2018),
and explores reflexive politics as a ‘political (agro)ecology
of praxis.’ The latter is the translation of this political eco-
logical ontology, through agroecology, into a programme
political action. This analytical frame and exploration of
praxis as counter-hegemonic resistance are examined in
relation to Latin America, and Bolivia and Ecuador par-
ticularly. In these latter states, the peasantry and in-
digenous groups were instrumental in overturning ne-
oliberalism in the 1990s and 2000s, only to have their
programme of ‘radical’ food sovereignty subsequently
co-opted and subverted by reformist capitalism and lib-
eral democracy. The ongoing dynamics of resistance, and
the prospects for substantive food democracy as ‘radical’
food sovereignty in these two states, are explored in the
latter part of the article.
2. The Shortcomings of ‘Formal’ Food Democracy
The imaginary of ‘formal’ food democracy differs from
the discourse on the Right to Food, from which it in part
arises, in its specific identification of the putative causal
basis of the lack of this ‘right.’ This causal basis, it asserts,
arises from the fact that capitalist economies, or, more
specifically, the ‘corporate’ food regime (McMichael,
2013), have, since the 1980s, increasingly constrained
the democratic capacity of liberal states, and popular de-
mands cannot be reconciled with what is assumed by its
proponents to be a state-market duopoly (see Hassanein,
2008; Vivero-Pol et al., 2019; see below for critique of
this binary view of the ‘state’ and ‘market’). ‘Formal’
food democracy ‘scrutinizes the constitutional surface of
the liberal state’ (Holt-Gimenez & van Lammeren, 2019,
p. 320) under which ‘corporate actors’ are assumed to
be the primary architects of what elsewhere has been
termed the ‘neoliberal’ food regime (Tilzey, 2019b). In
order to address this assumed co-optation of the ‘state’
by ‘corporate actors,’ ‘formal’ food democracy envisions
a broader ‘communicative realm’ not confined to liberal
constitutionalism, but focused rather on the way ‘discur-
sive sources of order’ can influence governance (Dryzek,
2000). ‘Food democracy is about citizens…being afforded
an equal opportunity to participate in decisions that af-
fect them’ (Hassanein, 2008, p. 287) where these relate
to food and food policy. ‘Formal’ food democracy thus
proposes ‘discursive democracy’ in which ‘citizens’ or
‘civil actors’ (part of an undifferentiated ‘multitude’) de-
mocratize governance by contesting established conven-
tions and influencing decision-making bodies through de-
liberative, rather than electoral, means (Holt-Gimenez &
van Lammeren, 2019).
The challenge for proponents of ‘formal’ food democ-
racy, then, is somehow to discursively construct a differ-
ent food regime, proposed to comprise elements of so-
cialization, de-commodification, localization, ‘common-
ing’, etc. (Vivero-Pol et al., 2019), when in reality this re-
quiresmaterial as well as discursive transformation away
from capitalist social-property relations. Moreover, this
is supposed to occur within a political structure of lib-
eral democracy that is actually the integral counterpart of
capitalist relations of production, founded on individual
rights andprivate property (the state-capital nexus; Tilzey,
2019b). For ‘formal’ food democracy, it is supposed that
the discursive revalorization of food, involving inter alia
the ideological rejection of food as a ‘pure commodity’
(neglecting, thereby, the material and class predicates of
food as commodity), enables a diversity of actors to come
together so that, once enlightened with the rationale of
‘food democracy,’ they assume agency as ‘food citizens’
(Holt-Gimenez & van Lammeren, 2019; Vivero-Pol, 2017).
This assumes that agents can engage in ‘pure agency’ ab-
stracted from their own structured positions andwithout
transforming the social-property relations which under-
pin the state-capital nexus. A more nuanced approach
would be to understand that agents act within and upon
pre-given structural constraints and opportunities rather
than being somehow autonomous from them. This view
is captured in the notion of ‘structured agency’ (Potter
& Tilzey, 2005) and in the ‘strategic relational approach’
(Jessop, 2005). In its voluntarism, ‘formal’ food democ-
racy thus dichotomizes ‘positionality,’ an agent’s ‘subjec-
tive’ view on an issue, from ‘class position,’ an agent’s ‘ob-
jective’ capacity or ability to transform structures to con-
formwith this view, the latter in fact no longer recognized
as an issue in the post-structural problematic of the ‘new
social movements.’ This is analogous to the difference be-
tween a formal ‘right to benefit’ and a substantive ‘ability
to benefit’ (Ribot & Peluso, 2003).
The shift from liberal constitutionalism to the re-
flexive agency of civil actors embodied in ‘formal’ food
democracy is illustrated by the proposal for ‘tricentric
governance’ whereby ‘self-regulated, civic collective ac-
tions for food’ acquire increased purchase over ‘state’
and ‘market’ (Vivero-Pol, 2017, 2019). Tricentric gover-
nance putatively rebalances the relative influence be-
tween ‘state,’ ‘economy’ and civil actions through the re-
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appropriation of public space from the first two in favour
of the third, with civil actors assuming an agency of their
own. In this way, a ‘mounting force of citizens’ actions
to reclaim food’ pressurizes the ‘state’ to shift from facil-
itator of capitalist ‘accumulation through enclosure’ to
regulator of the same, and provider of enabling frame-
works for food citizens. Thus, during this envisioned tran-
sition towards a new food regime, the ‘state’ is enjoined
to provide incentives and enabling frameworks, such as
basic food entitlement and food security floors, support
for alternative initiatives for food production and food
sharing at local scales, all effectively scaling back the juris-
diction of both ‘state’ and ‘market’ (Holt-Gimenez & van
Lammeren, 2019; Vivero-Pol, 2019). According to this
‘tricentric governance’ model, self-organized groups un-
der self-negotiated rule develop ‘food democracies,’ op-
erating through ‘nodes’ of connected but autonomous
food centres, attaining free association between produc-
ers and consumers (Caffentzis, 2010). At this point, the
role of the ‘state’ as regulator and provider of enabling
frameworks can diminish and both ‘states’ and ‘markets’
are demoted to simply one of many ways of allocat-
ing resources.
The concept of tricentric governance within ‘formal’
food democracy thus deploys an imaginary in which the
valuation of food as a common good unites otherwise
disparate actors within and across nation-states and the
global North–South divide (the ‘multitude’), elevating
food, in effect, above the capitalist mode of produc-
tion in which it is currently embedded (Vivero-Pol et al.,
2019). This narrative thus proposes that, were food con-
sidered to be subject to this deeper discursive democ-
racy, the global food system, together with capitalism,
would change (Vivero-Pol, 2017). In other words, the ex-
traordinary agency for change assumed by food democ-
racy advocates arises from the ‘unforced force of the bet-
ter argument’ alone (Habermas, 1996, p. 306). Thus, it is
asserted that the ideational power of discursive democ-
racy alone is a sufficient propellant to reconfigure the ne-
oliberal food regime’s governance structure.
Salient amongst the shortcomings of ‘formal’ food
democracy as described above is the assumption that
discursive, deliberative democracy alone will engender
a transformation towards more socially and ecologically
sustainable forms of production, with the principal polit-
ical agent here being the global Northern ‘eater’ or food
citizen (Hassanein, 2008; Holt-Gimenez& van Lammeren,
2019). Symptomatically, it is democratic force of argu-
ment alone, dissociated from questions of the owner-
ship of, and access to, the means of production or of the
necessary redistribution of these means, which is iden-
tified as the means to secure transformational change.
This assertion is in itself an inherently liberal and ‘post-
modern’ conception, drawing on the favoured ‘post-
Marxist’ thinking of Polanyi (1957; see Tilzey, 2017, for
extended critique of Polanyi) and Hardt and Negri (2000).
As we shall suggest below, it is no accident that this par-
ticular imaginary of change should be associated with
the global North, where affluence, increasingly depen-
dent on exploitation of the South, permits the educa-
tional, employment, welfare, andwider citizenship bene-
fits which permit positionality to be (relatively) divorced
from class position and from the wider material pred-
icates that enable such ‘reflexive citizenship.’ In other
words, affluence may afford the insulation from the ‘dull
compulsion of the economic’ which enables agents to
(relatively) divorce their views as ‘citizens’ (positionality)
from their immediate interests in the capitalist mode of
production from which that very affluence derives (class
position). By dissociating discursive democratic change
from the need to address social-property relations up-
held by the state-capital nexus, ‘formal’ food democracy
effectively leaves much of capital’s power intact (Holt-
Gimenez & van Lammeren, 2019). By the same token,
this elevation of citizen positionality at the expense of
class position as in the notion of the ‘multitude,’ ob-
scures difference and embedded asymmetries, serving
only to reproduce them. This is particularly true of the
profound asymmetries between North and South, which
asserted commonalities of ‘citizen interest’ serve to dis-
guise and therefore perpetuate.
In short, ‘formal’ food democracy remains ensnared
in a symptomatically Northern preoccupation with ‘right
to benefit,’ thereby ignoring the material predicates of
the ‘ability to benefit’ (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). In other
words, abilities to benefit from institutions and resources
are shaped by class and wider social-property relations
instantiated in the state-capital nexus. Recognition of
this fact requires a shift from ‘formal’ to ‘substantive’
food democracy. Such ‘substantive democracy’ has cer-
tain similarities with Bornemann and Weiland’s discus-
sion of different and complementary forms of empow-
erment which are ‘concerned with the development of
different forms of political power that, in turn, are re-
lated to different democratic principles, such as partic-
ipation (”power to”), deliberation (“power with”) and
representation (“power over”). Thus, empowerment is
not as such democratic; rather, empowerment is a pro-
cess of power generation that creates the conditions
for democracy.’ (Bornemann & Weiland, 2019, p. 108).
‘Formal’ food democracy, by contrast, conflates dis-
course, democracy, and equality, obstructing their strate-
gic relational assessment. Subverting the neoliberal food
regime requires the de-commodification and disman-
tling of the key structural (not merely discursive) under-
pinnings of capitalist social-property relations (see be-
low). In other words, constructing an anti-capitalist food
regime, or ‘substantive’ food democracy, will be pred-
icated on ‘class struggle’ (Federici & Caffentzis, 2014;
Tilzey, 2019b).
The deficiencies of ‘formal’ (or ‘progressive,’ rather
than ‘radical’) food democracy may thus be summarized
as follows:
First, it reifies the ‘political’ and focuses on discur-
sive elements, while neglecting the social-property rela-
tions underlying capitalism―i.e., it focuses on the ‘demo-
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cratic deficit’ to the neglect of ‘relations of production
and exploitation.’
Second, it has no, or an inadequate, theory of the
state, this being seen in essentialist terms usually as an
institution opposed to the ‘market,’ reflecting simplisti-
cally the ‘will of the people,’ rather than as a ‘social rela-
tion reflecting the balance of class interests in society.’
Third, and relatedly, it has no, or a deficient, un-
derstanding of ‘class’ and ‘class struggle,’ it being as-
sumed that somehow ‘civil society’ and ‘democracy’
have moved ‘beyond class’ in the manner of the ‘new so-
cial movements.’
Fourth, again relatedly, it holds a binary view of con-
testation between the ‘multitude’ of civil society versus
the ‘corporate’ food regime, in which the ‘state’ is called
upon to ‘regulate’ the latter and ‘protect’ the former in
Polanyian fashion. This reflects an undifferentiated view
of what is actually class-bound society, an inadequate
theory of the state (see above), and a simplistic view
of capital as being undifferentiated and wholly transna-
tional in orientation.
Fifth, it demonstrates an almost complete lack of
awareness of the differentiation of the capitalist world
system into an imperium (the global North) and a pe-
riphery (the global South), whereby the former, partic-
ularly under the ‘new imperialism’ of neoliberalism, is
able to sustain consumer, welfare, and liberal democratic
benefits at the expense of the latter, whence the bulk
of primary commodities and surplus value is now ex-
tracted as ‘cheaps.’ By contrast, it is commonly assumed
by ‘progressives’ and advocates of ‘formal’ food democ-
racy, that the ‘multitude’ in general, North and South, is
equally subject to the predations of the ‘corporate’ food
regime and requires a similar response by the ‘state’ or
by ‘supra-state’ institutions.
Sixth, it elevates initiatives in ‘food democracy’ to the
status of serious challenges to neoliberalism/capitalism,
when more frequently these merely subsist in the in-
terstices of capitalism and may, indeed, conform to
the process of neoliberal ‘de-statization,’ whereby the
state-capital nexus encourages the devolution and di-
vestment of former state responsibilities to community-
led schemes.
3. Defining a Theoretical Basis for ‘Radical’ Food
Democracy (as Food Sovereignty) and Understanding
the Causal Basis of ‘Formal’ Food Democracy
In order to define both the ‘political’ and ‘economic’
bases for ‘radical’ food democracy, we need to under-
stand the nature of the entities which require subver-
sion to achieve this end, together with the nature of
the (class) agents/agency that might be able to bring
this about. This requires us to develop a much more so-
phisticated understanding of capitalism, state, and class
than is deployed by proponents of ‘formal’ food democ-
racy. In terms of capitalism and the modern state, we
need to understand the twin aspects of this relation
that enable us to make sense of both entities in their
dialectical co-constitution: The ‘separation in unity’ of
the institutional spheres of the ‘economy’ and ‘polity,’
and the complementary accumulation and legitimation
functions of the state in relation to capital as defined,
helpfully, by regulation theory (Boyer & Saillard, 2002).
‘Progressives’ and ‘formal’ food democracy advocates de-
ploy a dichotomous, rather than dialectical, understand-
ing of the state-capital relation, with both entities rei-
fied and de-historicised. We suggest that an understand-
ing of the state-capital relation needs to go far deeper
than this, however. Following Poulantzas (1978), it is
more helpful to see the state, given the lack of ‘extra-
economic’ influence that individual capitals can exert,
as providing the essential institutional space for vari-
ous fractions of the capitalist class, in addition possi-
bly to other classes, to come together to form longer-
term strategies and alliances whilst, simultaneously, the
state disorganises non-capitalist classes through various
means of co-optation and division. The state, also for rea-
sons of legitimation, must, additionally, be ‘relatively au-
tonomous’ from the interests and demands of particu-
lar fractions of capital, and even from capital ‘in general.’
So, as Poulantzas (1978) suggests, the state represents
the condensation of the balance of class forces in soci-
ety. For advocates of ‘formal’ food democracy, by con-
trast, capital is a unitary entity, bereft of specific class
and class fractional content. This is counter-posed to a
‘state,’ a content-less abstraction which apparently rep-
resents, withoutmediation, the position of a generalised
counter-movement. This aligns with a Polanyian (Polanyi,
1957), indeed neoclassical, conception of the state and
capital as essentialised and opposed entities.
We suggest, therefore, that the modern state is bet-
ter conceptualised as itself a social relation. That is, an
arena or container (the state-capital nexus; Taylor, 1994;
van Apeldoorn, de Graaff, & Overbeek, 2012), within
which class contestation and compromise is played out,
principally to secure the material and ideological re-
production of the hegemonic fractions of capital, even
where these may be transnational in orientation. Thus,
within capitalism, the institutionally separated spheres
of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ are dialectically cog-
nate and implied, with their very ‘separation in unity’ a
consequence of the commodification of labour power
and the establishment of absolute property rights in
the means of production. At the same time, the mod-
ern state acquires a strategic ‘political’ role which the
individual capitalist cannot fulfil. The state was instru-
mental in effecting the process of ‘primitive accumula-
tion’ which created a proletariat ‘free’ to sell its labour
power to the capitalist (Perelman, 2000), in other words,
of founding the material and class relations (social-
property relations) onwhich capitalism is founded. Once
capitalism was installed, the state deployed its power
further to maintain and guarantee absolute property
rights by the capitalist class, and to institute and support
regimes of work discipline required by this new mode
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(Wolf, 1982, p. 100). The modern state also assumed
the essential role of arbitrating and managing contes-
tation between fractions of capital (inter-capitalist com-
petition), and between capitalists and its labour force,
and of representing the interests of capital in the inter-
national arena.
This also points to the vital importance of class in-
terests in the dynamics of food regimes, one which con-
founds the ‘formal’ food democracy assumption regard-
ing a simple binary of ‘civil society,’ acting ‘beyond’ class,
in opposition to ‘corporate’ interests. The reality is that
the interests being deployed in food system dynamics
aremuchmore differentiated and class-bound than is im-
plied in this binary assumption. In fact, the prime mover
in the formation and reproduction of food regimes is the
social-property (class) relations in the hegemonic state
(in the world system) and the international articulation
of these relations with receptive and complementary
class interests in other states (Tilzey, 2019b).
This understanding of the capital-state-class relation
makes it clear that liberal democracy, or even deeper
forms of democracy where confined to the discursive
or ‘political’ level, mask more profound forms of unfree-
dombased in capitalist social-property relations. This ‘cit-
izenship illusion’ arises from the reified structure of cap-
italist social relations itself. It comprises an ‘objectified
illusion’ which reveals and conceals simultaneously: It
‘reveals’ certain limited rights and freedoms in the ‘po-
litical’ sphere whilst concealing the class inequalities of
the ‘economic’ sphere (Wood, 2005). As a reified social
form, liberal democracy both constrains certain types of
social action or existence, such as the ability to freely
access the means of production or subsistence, whilst
enabling others, such as being ‘free’ to compete in the
capitalist market. The structural separation of the ‘eco-
nomic’ and ‘political’ spheres within the modern state
was thus intended to constrain actions which might im-
pinge on the economic powers of capital (such as free ac-
cess to the means of subsistence), whilst enabling purely
political rights and obligations (Mooers, 2014; Wood,
1991). We suggest that ‘formal’ food democracy remains
in important respects ensnared in this ‘citizenship illu-
sion,’ the latter designed to conceal the deeper con-
tradiction between politico-legal equality, on the one
hand, and class inequality and exploitation, on the other.
As we shall argue below, even the conferral of such
constrained, liberal citizenship rights has been contin-
gent on imperialism and the territorial form of the state,
defining those substantively included in citizenship rights
(the majority in the global North) and those substan-
tively excluded (the majority in the global South). This
is why Marx (1981) insisted that political emancipation
embodied in abstract citizenship remains only a partial
victory, and one rendered more partial still because of
its reliance on the ‘spatio-temporal’ fix that is imperial-
ism. This is why, we argue, ‘formal’ food democracy re-
mains inadequate to the task of fulfilling the mission of
‘radical’ food sovereignty―radical egalitarianism (Patel,
2011)―, since this requires the abrogation of the key
social-property relations underpinning the capital-state
nexus (see below).
Liberal democracy, deployed by the state-capital
nexus, has been a powerful means of co-opting non-
capitalist classes and deflecting attention away from the
exploitative and class-based nature of capitalism. This
ability to co-opt and deflect resistance has been differen-
tially located in the global North, however, based in hege-
mony (as domination through consensus) founded on
material rewards (consumerism), nation-building, and
the bestowal of politico-legal rights that follow from cit-
izenship. This liberal democratic consensus attained its
apogee during the Keynesian era, but has been under
increasing strain during the course of neoliberalism. In
the face of increased neoliberal class exploitation, at-
tempts to sustain this class compact in the global North
have been undertaken increasingly by means of impe-
rial relations, both ‘informal’ (economic) and ‘formal’
(politico-military) with the global South. Resurgent ne-
oliberal primitive accumulation, with the state acting as
an organ of the expropriators and agro-exporting frac-
tions of capital, has served to undermine the legitimacy
functions of the state-capital nexus throughout much of
the global South. The outcome of this new imperial re-
lationship between the North and South is that citizens
of the former are accorded economic and political priv-
ileges denied to those in the capitalist periphery. These
privileges form the unacknowledged basis for the imag-
inary of ‘formal’ food democracy, tied implicitly to this
‘imperial mode of living.’
This legitimacy deficit in the global South, together
with the ‘formal’ rather than ‘real’ subsumption within
capital of the semi-proletarian majority, carries with
it the increased likelihood of challenge to the state-
capital nexus by counter-hegemonic forces. Attempted re-
appropriations of the state and subversion of capitalism
are implied, comprising re-assertions of national, and pos-
sibly post-national forms of sovereignty, including ‘rad-
ical’ food sovereignty, or ‘substantive’ food democracy
(Tilzey, 2018). Such ‘radical’ counter-hegemonic forces po-
tentially challenge, then, the essential foundations of cap-
italism, propounding a more Marxian (reversal of prim-
itive accumulation) than Polanyian (‘embedding’ of capi-
talism) or ‘formal’ democratic, imaginary of social change
(Tilzey, 2017). Thus, peripheral forms of capital accumu-
lation, upon which the affluence and ‘reified’ discursive
democracy of the North is premised, are generatingmore
fundamental resistances to the state-capital nexus by
‘radical’ and counter-hegemonic food sovereignty move-
ments in the global South. These are potentially most dis-
ruptive to the neoliberal food regime because it is in the
global South, as a periphery for the Northern core, that
the contradictions of capital accumulation are greatest
and the legitimacy of the state is lowest. Consequently,
it is in the South that the potential for transformations to-
wards ‘radical’ or ‘substantive’ food democracy appears
greatest. In the next section, we explore the dynamics
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of these counter-hegemonic resistances in relation to the
Latin American states of Bolivia and Ecuador.
4. The Prospects for Food Sovereignty as
Counter-Hegemony: Experiences from Latin America
and Lessons for ‘Food Democracy’
Counter-hegemony is here taken to mean opposition
to, and autonomy from, the state-capital nexus―that
is, from capitalism and its material and discursive sup-
porting structures within the modern state, as ‘mod-
ern sovereignty,’ including that of ‘formal’ democracy.
‘Radical’ food sovereignty, as the ability to produce es-
sential use values unmediated by the capitalist mar-
ket, comprises a foundational element of such counter-
hegemony, as agrarian democracy. Crucial here, then
also, is how we choose to define capitalism and its re-
lation to the modern state because this definition will
influence deeply how we envisage counter-hegemony
as emancipatory politics. The essential point here is
that participative democracy should be integral to,
not independent from, the process of fundamental
change away from capitalist social-property relations. In
other words, ‘political’ emancipation will be less than
meaningful unless undertaken in conjunction with ‘eco-
nomic’ emancipation.
The definition of such counter-hegemony preferred
here derives from the school of so-called ‘political
Marxism,’ exemplified in the work of Brenner (1977,
1985), Wood (1995, 2009), and Mooers (1991), par-
ticularly. This approach has much in common with
Gramscian and Poulantzian theory (see Poulantzas,
1978), with an emphasis on class dynamics and social-
property relations within the state as key explanatory
factors, whilst seeking to situate these dynamics within
thewider enabling and constraining political economy of
the world capitalist core-periphery structure (see Tilzey,
2018, for full delineation of this approach). Following ‘po-
litical Marxism’ (see Tilzey, 2017, 2018; Vergara-Camus,
2014), we can understand capitalism as the contradic-
tory combination of a set of social relations character-
ized by:
• The separation, wholly or partially, of workers
from their means of production;
• Market dependence of producers (the compulsion
to depend on a competitive market for the repro-
duction either of the worker [and family] or of the
capitalist enterprise);
• The dominance of absolute private property (the
extirpation of common rights in land, and the de-
termination of the right to land only through the
capitalist market and, therefore, the alienability of
land through its commodification);
• The compulsive imperative of competition among
producers (both workers and capitalists);
• The separation of the ‘economic’ from the ‘politi-
cal’ in the form of the modern, capitalist state;
• Commodity fetishism and the compulsion to pro-
duce ever more commodities, with severe adverse
implications for biophysical fabric of the planet;
• The predominance of exchange value over use-
value since surplus value extracted from workers
is contained in commodities sold on the market.
The loss of the labourer’s control over his/her labour
power that is entailed in the expropriation of labourers
from their means of production through the process of
‘primitive accumulation’ is, as we have seen, the abso-
lutely key element in the emergence of the above char-
acteristics. It is the obstruction or reversal of this pro-
cess of primitive accumulation that comprises, as sug-
gested, the absolutely key demand and desire of counter-
hegemonic peasant forces in the global South―this de-
mand and desire persists because the majority of subal-
terns in the global South are semi-proletarians, still re-
taining some access to land, however inadequate this
may be (they are formally, rather than really, subsumed
within capitalist relations of production, the latter con-
dition applying to proletarians). Such direct access to
non-commodified land exemplifies a form of produc-
tion in which the labourer (semi-proletarian) still con-
trols his/her labour power and, to some extent, the
degree and form of integration into the market. Thus,
semi-proletarian peasants, even those who depend on
the market for the fulfilment of a significant element of
their subsistence needs, havemore room for manoeuvre
(more ‘autonomy’), through the adjustment of produc-
tion and consumption, than their fully proletarianized
counterparts (Vergara-Camus, 2014). Under the prevail-
ing conditions of precarity and ‘jobless growth,’ such au-
tonomy, even if partial, is greatly valued. Unsurprisingly,
the aspiration of many under such circumstances is to
secure greater autonomy from the capitalist market, in
other words, to secure greater access to land in order
to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of basic use
values such as food. The aspiration, in other words, is
to secure a relation to the market that is one of oppor-
tunity, not of compulsion. Such a condition might be
described variously as one of radical food sovereignty,
agrarian democracy, or what we have elsewhere termed
livelihood sovereignty (Tilzey, 2018).
The desire for agrarian democracy has indeed be-
come ever more insistent as the contradictions of neolib-
eralism have mounted and the proletariat has increas-
ingly acquired the status of a precariat. Access to land,
however limited, often provides, under these conditions,
the only real element of livelihood security. Thus, strug-
gles in the countryside and in the city often have an
essentially peasant character due to the incapacity of
‘disarticulated’ development (de Janvry, 1981) to pro-
vide salaried employment (real subsumption) as a vi-
able alternative to secure the means of livelihood. Both
peasants and workers seek refuge in the peasant situ-
ation, therefore, that is, in the auto-production of use
values, to the greatest degree possible, to meet funda-
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mental needs. The rise of indigenous and ecological con-
sciousness since the 1990s, and the simultaneous de-
legitimation of capitalist modernism, have served only to
reinforce the hunger for land and aversion to full prole-
tarianization (Moyo & Yeros, 2005). Thus, the resolution
of the unresolved agrarian question of the peasantry in
much of the global South, particularly in the current eco-
logically constrained and increasingly volatile conjunc-
ture, seems more than ever to be, of necessity, agrarian
and peasant in nature. In this, the potential for mass mo-
bilization on the part of the middle/lower peasantries,
the precariat, and indigenous groups, for an agrarian so-
lution to the contradictions, ‘political’ and ‘ecological,’
of capitalism (expressed in ongoing primitive accumula-
tion) does not seem unrealistic. Indeed, the history of
‘peasant wars’ (Wolf, 1999), including the recent wave of
anti-neoliberal uprisings in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nepal and
elsewhere, indicate ample precedent for this (Moyo &
Yeros, 2005).
The point to be emphasized here is that, because
of the operation of the ‘imperial mode of living,’ radi-
cal change is most likely to occur in the ‘peripheries’ of
the capitalist world system. No inevitability or teleology
is implied here, of course, and this assertion is most def-
initely not a manifesto for ‘sitting back and waiting’ for
radical change to emerge from the global South. It is
simply to identify where the potential agents of radical
change are differentially located, and the great difficulty
in getting radical messages to resonate with the major-
ity in the imperium, where this majority’s livelihood and
imaginary are so deeply embroiled in a normalized ‘impe-
rial mode of living,’ including that of liberal democracy.
Indeed, the capacity of the state-capital nexus to sub-
vert counter-hegemony, both through consumerism and
‘formal’ democracy, is amply demonstrated even in the
global South, where we may point to the experiences of
radical food sovereignty movements over the ‘progres-
sive’ cycle of the Latin American ‘pink tide’ states.
Thus, the 1990s and 2000s saw widespread resis-
tance in Latin America to the socially polarizing conse-
quences of neoliberalism and to the progressive loss of
national sovereignty (including sovereignty over food)
that accompanied neo-imperial dependent ‘develop-
ment’ (Veltmeyer & Petras, 2000). Bolivia and Ecuador
are exemplary ‘pink tide’ states where ‘radical’ forces,
comprising middle/lower peasantry, semi-proletarians,
proletarians and landless, and indigenous people, en-
gaged in what proved to be a fateful alliance with ‘pro-
gressive’ national bourgeoisie and upper peasantry to
displace neoliberalism, only to install national-popular
regimes of reformist capitalism (note that our class an-
alytical frame does not homogenize the peasantry, as
does the ‘populist’ framework of McMichael, 2013, and
others). Both states have a new commitment to greater
state guidance and interventionism in the economy, to
national food sovereignty (albeit largely rhetorical), for-
mal democracy, and to the introduction of social pro-
grammes to alleviate the severe incomedisparities of the
neoliberal era. Funds for the latter, however, are predi-
cated on the proceeds of the ‘new’ extractivism of min-
erals, fossil-fuels, and agri-fuels, offered by the emer-
gence of sub-imperial states, notably China (Veltmeyer
& Petras, 2014). These funds have been deployed to sub-
sidize welfarism and infrastructure projects, placating
counter-hegemonic constituencies, whose demands for
radical land redistribution and land rights remain largely
unmet. These ‘national-popular’ regimes have expanded
and deepened liberal democracy, at least temporarily,
but have failedmeaningfully to challenge capitalist social-
property relations (Tilzey, 2019a).
Thus, in Bolivia, a broad coalition of peasant, in-
digenous, and worker organizations (Pacto de Unidad)
succeeded in overthrowing the neoliberal regime in
2003 and installing Evo Morales’ MAS (Movimiento al
Socialismo) party in power from 2005. Inter alia, these
organizations sought an ‘agrarian revolution,’ entail-
ing massive redistribution of land away from the oli-
garchy and in favour of the peasantry. The success of
MAS was also dependent, however, on the support
of the national bourgeoisie and the upper peasantry,
and it was these constituencies which came to de-
fine MAS policies as national-popular capitalism, rather
than an (agro)ecologically-based socialism. MAS came
to be a regime which pursued a sub-hegemonic, or
populist, programme of capitalist reformism, placating
its counter-hegemonic constituency through welfarism,
anti-imperial rhetoric, and the conferral of enhanced
‘formal’ democratic rights, and soothing the landed oli-
garchy through accelerated agri-food extractivism and ef-
fective exemption from agrarian reform (McKay, 2017;
Tilzey, 2019a; Webber, 2017; see Catacora-Vargas et al.,
2017, for status of agroecology in Bolivia).
The experience of Ecuador is very similar. The period
leading up to 2006 saw counter-hegemonic social move-
ments presenting a powerful challenge to neoliberalism.
These movements, comprising theMesa Agraria, signed
an agreement with the future president Rafael Correa
(amiddle-class populist), inwhich he gave a commitment
to initiate, upon election, an ‘agrarian revolution’ based
on the peasant/indigenous movement demand for ‘rad-
ical’ food sovereignty. This was to be centred on the
democratization of land access, and on state resources
for the revival and stimulation of the ‘peasant’ econ-
omy (Clark, 2017; Giunta, 2014). Again, like Morales in
Bolivia, however, it was never Correa’s intention to chal-
lenge capitalist social-property relations. As in Bolivia,
this was to be a national-popular, capitalist-reformist
regime. Its populism pivoted on the nationally-focused
bourgeoisies’ and petty bourgeois class fractions’ easy
co-optation of the ‘progressive’ tendencywithin the food
sovereignty movement, and the neutralization of the
‘radical’ tendency through social welfare payments, con-
struction projects funded by extractivism, and a preoccu-
pation with formal democratic process. The regime also
placated the landed oligarchy by effectively exempting it
from the ‘agrarian revolution,’ a revolution which, how-
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ever, has largely failed to materialize (Henderson, 2017;
Intriago et al., 2017; Tilzey, 2019a).
These states, in their ability to subvert counter-
hegemony through consumerism, welfarism, and for-
mal democracy, thus represent, in microcosm (albeit
as a pale reflection of), the ‘imperial mode of living.’
Nonetheless, this ability to subvert and co-opt is time-
limited, being dependent on the non-renewable char-
acter of neo-extractivism and the ecological despolia-
tion that this entails. With counter-hegemonic demands
for an ‘agrarian revolution’ unmet, the exhaustion of re-
sources and soils through extractivism will presage dwin-
dling funds for the ‘compensatory’ capitalist state, the
unravelling of fragile populist alliances, and a resurgence
of ‘radical’ resistance. This time around, the scarcity of
‘ecological surplus’ from extractivism will severely curtail
the ability of the state-capital nexus to deflect counter-
hegemonic forces from seeking an agroecological and
peasant-based resolution of the agrarian question―a re-
versal of ‘primitive accumulation’ to address both ru-
ral and urban precarity through ‘livelihood sovereignty’
(Tilzey, 2018, 2019a).
The experiences of the MST (Movimiento de
Trabajadores Rurales sin Tierra) in Bolivia are exemplary
in this regard and may constitute a model which has the
potential to be ‘scaled-up’ in the event of (and, of course,
to contribute to), the demise of the state-capital nexus.
The dynamics of this movement help us to identify a
strategy of emancipatory rural politics whereby counter-
hegemony, as food and livelihood sovereignty (agrarian
democracy),may be implanted at ‘local’ level as a formof
‘autonomy’ (confronting ‘capitalism from below’), whilst,
simultaneously, recognizing the need to engage the state
(‘capitalism from above’) to secure a more generalized
form of autonomy. The MST seems to embody a ‘dual
strategy’ approach, exploiting current opportunities for
autonomy where possible, whilst amplifying the strug-
gle for deeper and wider transformation through ap-
propriation and subversion of the state-capital nexus
itself. It also seems to represent the kind of ‘radical’ food
sovereignty, or agrarian democracy, which we have iden-
tified in this article as counter-hegemony. Thus, the MST
has embraced radical, participatory democracy, advocat-
ing collective ownership of land, and drawing on, while
‘reinventing,’ communal traditions inspired by the pre-
Columbian ayllu (Fabricant, 2012). This, in short, entails
a decommodification of livelihoods, most importantly by
subverting, materially as well as ideologically, capitalist
social-property relations. The reversal of primitive accu-
mulation, through access to land, represents the preem-
inent prerequisite of this. This, in effect, is to invoke a
Marxian, rather than a Polanyian, response to capital-
ist social-property relations through decommodification
(see Vail, 2010, for more general discussion).
The MST has built an organizational structure that is
democratic and participatory, capable of creating order
and holding leaders and rank-and-file to account through
collective governance (Fabricant, 2012). This is a form
of grassroots citizenship, inspired by, but also reconfig-
uring, Andean principles of autonomy, self-governance,
and participatory democracy. This stands in contrast to
liberal citizenship as individualism, ‘given’ to members
as a right by the state. The Andean ideal of the ayllu,
imagined as community-held land and collective forms
of governance and control, has become the principal
framework for governing MST settlements. These mod-
ern ayllus are characterized by nucleated settlements,
communal landholdings, rotational political and admin-
istrative offices, land redistribution, and rural tax collec-
tion. The MST has adapted the ayllu model to structure
their political organization at the community, regional,
and national levels. The state has fractionalized land and
territory through amodel of citizenship that has assigned
absolute property rights to individuals, thus dichotomiz-
ing the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ (Hylton & Thomson,
2007). The MST asserts, by contrast, that complete do-
minion over land by an individual or group is itself illegit-
imate. Rather, land is a collective right and should entail
stewardship rather than absolute dominion. The occupa-
tion of land signifies reclaiming and re-territorializing in-
digenous/peasant control and autonomy over land and
other critical resources (Fabricant, 2012). The dynamic
relationship between territorial autonomy and the abil-
ity to provide a political infrastructure that sustains hu-
manity is designated by indigenous conceptualizations
such as buen vivir, a reintegration of the ‘political,’ the
‘economic,’ and the ‘ecological’ (Tilzey, 2017). The MST’s
idea of food sovereignty and agroecology is deeply em-
bedded in collaborative and collective forms of produc-
tion. The MST has revived and politicized essentialized
notions of Andean rural culture by establishing ayni (reci-
procity) and minka (exchange) as forms of resistance to
the capitalist, large-scale, agro-industrial production of
the oligarchy (Fabricant, 2012). In their re-appropriation
of this cultural model as antithetical to capitalism, the
MST affirms the social, collective, and reciprocal forms
of production, in which all members of the community
benefit from family farming.
The MST has, however, been successful in establish-
ing such settlements only in a small number of cases
by exploiting a legal loophole which enables squatters
to file a petition for ownership where the land in ques-
tion is not being put to socially productive use (Fabricant,
2012). The MST is painfully aware, however, that such
autonomy as exists in these small number of success-
ful cases is founded on a fragile legal loophole within
a more generalized system of absolute property rights
which the capitalist state is committed to uphold (Tilzey,
2019a). It recognizes, therefore, that a far greater, and
more thoroughgoing, transformation of social-property
relations is required if its model of ayllu-inspired auton-
omy for the landless and land-poor peasantry is to be
more widely implanted. This serves perhaps to highlight
the limitations of autonomism (and ‘formal’ food democ-
racy) as a doctrine that assumes that real change can
occur ‘without taking power’ or, in other words, with-
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out addressing the causal basis of poverty, marginaliza-
tion and ecological despoliation generated by ‘capital-
ism from above,’ orchestrated by the state. This is rec-
ognized by the MST. While seizing all the opportunities
available at the local level to secure access to land and
institute collective ways of life as food sovereignty, the
MST recognizes that the limits to this strategy are de-
fined precisely by the forces of unsustainability that need
to be confronted. This confrontation can occur only if
the struggle is taken to the state by means of a dual
strategy designed fundamentally to transform capitalist
social-property relations.
5. Conclusion
The experiences of Bolivia and Ecuador serve to demon-
strate just how challenging it is for counter-hegemonic
social movements to displace the state-capital nexus,
even where these movements comprise the majority of
the citizenry, possess clearly defined and feasible ob-
jectives for ‘radical’ food sovereignty, and are offered
relatively insecure and inadequate welfare/employment
benefits in ‘compensation’ for the thwarted ‘agrarian
revolution.’ How much greater, then, are the challenges
for counter-hegemony in the global North, where such
movements are much more marginal, comprise a small
minority of the citizenry, face severe structural obsta-
cles to ‘radical’ alternatives (that consequently appear
utopian), and where the aspiration and tangible reality
for themajority, at least in the shorter-term, is one of rel-
atively secure employment and consumerism within the
‘imperialmode of living.’ This is not to trivialize the impor-
tant efforts of ‘food democracy’movements in the global
North, such as those involved in food cooperatives and
community-supported agriculture, but merely to point
up how much more work and effort are required: First,
to ‘visibilize’ and ‘de-reify’ the ‘imperial mode of living’;
second, to avoid co-optation into the material rewards
of consumerism and the ideological obfuscations of na-
tionalism (for example, Brexit and Trumpism); and, third
and perhaps most important, to address the immense
structural constraints presented by deeply entrenched
private property rights, the separation of the citizen ma-
jority from the means of livelihood, and the commodifi-
cation of those means of livelihood (notably land) such
that they are unavailable other than to a wealthy few.
Part of this work is to politicize, rather than to construe
as ‘evolutionary’ inevitability, the phenomenon of prim-
itive accumulation (that is, the historical and forced sep-
aration of the majority from their means of livelihood),
and to lay bare the ‘predication’ of the imperial mode
of living, and the preoccupation with formal rights and
democracy, upon the perpetuation of this phenomenon
throughout much of the global South today. This is simul-
taneously to reformulate the problem of ‘food democ-
racy’ as an issue, not merely of deepening and extending
democracy around principle of ‘right to food,’ but also of
challenging the capitalist social-property relations which
underlie social inequality and ecological unsustainability.
This, ultimately, is a question of redressing primitive ac-
cumulation, through ‘radical’ food sovereignty as agrar-
ian democracy.
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